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   ABSTRACT
In this paper, I consider practical strategies 
for resolving the epistemic injustice that 
ill persons face when seeking medical 
treatment. My arguments will expand 
upon those initially made by Havi Carel and 
Ian James Kidd in “Epistemic Injustice in 
Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.” My 
approach to this problem is twofold. First, I 
will demonstrate how the phenomenological 
toolkit, as it currently stands, emphasizes 
the patient’s experience and leaves the 
doctor’s experience unadjusted. After this, I 
will explain how the toolkit can be improved 
to include the doctor’s perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A hospital is, in many ways, an excellent microcosm of the 
society within which it exists. In the developed world, we see public 
interest colliding rather chaotically with private interest, we see highly 
trained and well-paid medical personnel scrambling to treat a perhaps 
unsustainable plethora of patients, and we see chronically ill persons, 
a special type of patient, whose schedule of visits to the doctor’s 
office is not quite as terminal as the illness they probably possess, 
consistently overstepped and ignored. All this, and more, in the spirit 
of the scientific method. What is it exactly that causes and permits 
this overstepping, and what might we, as philosophers and medical 
professionals, do to fix it? 
The issue stems primarily from the disproportionate values 
assigned to the knowledge of the doctor and the knowledge of the 
chronically ill patient. Because medicine is, in fact, an applied science, 
the level of importance granted to objectively acquired data, like lab 
results for example, always exceeds that of subjective testimony, such 
as the patient’s feelings of pain or discomfort. This type of prejudice 
ensures that modern healthcare professionals (HCPs) regularly devalue 
the testimony of their patients, even when said testimony pertains to 
the patient’s wellness plan, simply out of convention: “The patient can’t 
possibly know more about their cancer than I do. They’re just a patient. 
I’m the doctor.” This sense of entitlement, acquired from, among other 
things, the social prestige of the position, is called epistemic privilege 
and is the source of the mistreatment of chronically ill persons. In the 
following, I will refer to this mistreatment as epistemic injustice.
The question remains, however: How can the study of philosophy 
rid the medical field of epistemic privilege and epistemic injustice? 
Something must be done beyond simply proving that patient testimony 
is useful. What needs to happen, then, is that doctors must be given 
the opportunity to properly see the patient not merely as an object 
but also as a subject. If the patient/doctor interaction can be altered to 
include a mandated and overseen shared experience, then compassion 
will prevail, and the significance of the patient’s testimony will be 
reasserted.
In the following sections, I will provide a critical summary of Havi 
Carel and Ian James Kidd’s essay, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: 
A Philosophical Analysis,” in addition to providing a counterargument 
to the authors’ conclusion. I will demonstrate that while Kidd and 
Carel’s “phenomenological toolkit,” as it stands, may be useful 
against individual instances of epistemic injustice, unless it undergoes 
considerable revision, it will be unable to affect the much larger 
problem of epistemic privilege.1 The altered toolkit, after these revisions 
have been implemented, will include three steps: (1) bidirectional 
expression of intent, (2) formal mediation, and (3) posthumous review. 
I will explain the details as well as the significance of these steps at 
considerable length in the pages that follow.
II. CRITICAL SUMMARY OF CAREL AND KIDD’S  
ARTICLE
Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd, in “Epistemic Injustice in 
Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis,” explain the various types 
of epistemic injustice that occur within modern medical practice 
between doctors and patients. They attempt to determine the 
exact source of this epistemological imbalance—i.e., the medical 
practitioner’s unquestioned authority over the patient—and ultimately 
provide a “phenomenological toolkit” to allow patients to express 
their concerns and beliefs regarding their respective illnesses. This 
expression of concern is supposed to enable the patient to experience 
a type of catharsis; furthermore, the doctor, by virtue of having 
witnessed this expression, can better sympathize with the patient’s 
illness.
The authors divide epistemic injustice into two broad categories—
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice—the former referring 
to instances where a patient’s testimony is devalued (i.e., not believed) 
and the latter referring to instances where a patient is not given the 
opportunity or ability to communicate properly with their doctor. 
Epistemic privilege is the mechanism by which ill persons 
experience epistemic injustice. The healthcare industry, as an archetype 
of society, encourages a delimiting hierarchy of values, including, but 
not limited to, certain modes of communication. As aforesaid, within 
this system, the doctor, in part because of the sheer convenience of it, 
possesses a flexibility of expression not shared by the patient they treat. 
The most immediate consequence of this privilege is the ability, both as 
a passive and active force, to determine which modes of communication 
are valid. Their epistemic privilege, then, is twofold; on the one hand, 
their knowledge is considered superior by default, both internally 
and externally, and on the other, they, alone, decide how the broader 
conversation develops.
Consequently, Carel and Kidd use vocabulary reminiscent of 
social activism. This diction suggests that the issue is not merely 
1 Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A 
Philosophical Analysis,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17, no. 4 (2014): 
531, 10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2.
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a philosophical (or scientific) one—consisting of abstractions and 
hypotheticals—but one of a specific, human importance: relevant, 
applicable, and necessary. In this way, “ill persons” are analyzed 
as a subset of disenfranchised people, and HCPs are deemed 
socioeconomically exalted, or “privileged.”
Spread throughout Carel and Kidd’s analysis of how a culture of 
medical professionals has continued to unjustifiably objectify their 
patients is the suggestion that what best characterizes a successful 
patient/doctor relationship is absolute trust given and received by both 
parties. When hermeneutical injustice occurs, and a patient is not given 
the tools by which to communicate their pain or their concerns, the 
lack of communication contributes to a lack of trust. Similarly, when 
a doctor disregards a patient’s testimony (i.e., testimonial injustice) as 
frivolous or unprofessional, the patient is discouraged from providing 
testimony in general. Carel and Kidd write 
But we might also find that even when the clinician’s assumption of 
epistemic authority in relation to matter x is correct, the clinician’s 
style of interaction is overly dismissive. Her disregard of the patient’s 
perspective on x might still be detrimental to the patient’s well-being, not 
least since the judgment that one’s testimonies have been disregarded 
tends to undermine one’s ability and willingness to engage in further 
interpersonal exchanges.2
The clinician’s style, irrespective of content, can damage the trust 
necessary for the doctor to adequately do their job, which is ensuring 
the mental and physical well-being of the patient.
Perhaps most intriguing is the authors’ solution to the issue of 
epistemic injustice: the phenomenological toolkit. According to 
Carel and Kidd, “It provides a flexible individual tool which patients 
and clinicians can use to develop their understanding of their illness 
experiences. It includes three steps: [1] bracketing the natural attitude, 
[2] thematizing illness, and [3] reviewing the ill person’s being in the 
world.”3 For Carel and Kidd, the patient’s lack of trust in the self as 
well as their overwhelming “trust” for their doctor—although perhaps 
holy dread is a better term—coupled with the doctor’s overwhelming 
trust in themselves and abundant lack of trust in their patient is the 
precise social climate that allows epistemic injustice to thrive. The 
best way, then, to undermine this process is for the patient to derive a 
specific meaningfulness from their ill state (a type of objectification: an 
ownership) and for the doctor to derive a specific meaningfulness from 
the patient (a type of subjectification: a letting-go). Taken together, 
2 Carel and Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare,” 531.  
3 Carel and Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare,” 537-38. 
the three steps of Carel and Kidd’s phenomenological toolkit allow 
the patient to experience their illness in a way that is comfortable and 
uninhibiting. It is assumed—because the authors do not discuss the 
toolkit from the doctor’s perspective—that the medical professional, by 
virtue of having seen this phenomenon occur, is now made aware of the 
patient’s actual ontology. 
The toolkit’s first step, bracketing the natural attitude, is designed 
to permit both the patient and clinician to observe the illness, not as a 
disease entity, but as a total experience. The focus, here as elsewhere, is 
on patient testimony—ultimately in the hopes that they may perceive 
the illness in less prescriptive ways. Thematizing the illness brings 
into question the various perspectives that HCPs, patients, and family 
members may have vis-à-vis the illness’s identity function—e.g., what 
the HCP may see as malignant and objectively bad, the patient may 
see as an essential part of themselves.4 Carel and Kidd suggest that this 
step of the toolkit be applied via focus group. The final step, by way 
of practical application, encourages the patient to consider themselves 
as existing in the world in the newly-defined context of the disease 
experience. It is the culmination of the first two steps and occurs both 
individually and subjectively, i.e., independent of the HCP.
While the central thesis of “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare” is 
for the most part exemplary, it does suffer from one major blindspot, 
inasmuch as it fails to address the actual source of the problem: it 
does nothing, or at least very little, to combat the epistemic privilege 
possessed by HCPs. In this vein, the paper would have benefited 
greatly from a clearer explanation of how the phenomenological toolkit 
directly adjusts the doctor’s perception of the patient—the most lasting 
change, as it were, occurring from within.
III. MY ARGUMENT
Considering the risk/benefit of implementing any such 
toolkit for any such egalitarian purpose, the authors’ assumptions 
regarding the existence of epistemic injustice against ill persons 
seem plausible enough to warrant reform of the kind described. 
The phenomenological toolkit, in permitting ill persons to express 
themselves, could potentially resolve both complaints, albeit in different 
ways. What is perhaps most concerning about the toolkit, however, is 
that it does not apply to the doctor’s own subjective experience enough. 
While the problem of systemic epistemic injustice is sociopolitical, 
it is also philosophical, insofar as the epistemic imbalance results not 
only from a lack of trust, socioeconomic status, or even professional 
4 Essential to this step is the juxtaposition of distinct, though not necessarily 
antithetical, viewpoints.
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and also how these alterations affect each of their roles in the doctor/
patient relationship. In this renewed environment, the doctor will be 
encouraged, just like the patient, to express their beliefs/perspectives 
with respect to each of Carel and Kidd’s steps. Unless the doctor 
subjectively experiences the patient subjectively experiencing the 
doctor, it runs the risk that the patient may feel understood without 
it actually being the case. This, as it were, treats the symptom but not 
the disease. (2) Formal mediation will include a trained professional 
supervising the dialogue between doctor and patient, ensuring that 
it is clear and symmetrical. The mediator will also document the 
implementation of the toolkit. It is important that the mediator 
approach the exchange free of bias. (3) The last step will include 
an uninvolved board of clinicians and volunteer patients/mediators 
reviewing all pertinent documentation, evaluating the overall efficacy 
of the exchange, suggesting improvements, and reinforcing effective 
techniques. This final step is significant in that it takes place after the 
toolkit has been implemented. Its aim is to improve the efficacy of 
future toolkits.
I am well aware that these suggestions involve a drastic 
reconfiguration of common healthcare practices, most of which will 
be rather expensive and time-consuming to implement, but—as many 
have said before me and are sure to say again—human equality, if 
anything, is worth the trouble.8 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENT/OBJECTION TO MY VIEW
Readers will notice two notable weaknesses in my thesis. The 
first addresses the efficacy of the model, and the second addresses its 
efficiency. In an attempt to legitimize the personhood of the patient to 
the doctor, I have suggested that the doctor’s personhood concurrently 
be demonstrated to the patient. This requires that Carel and Kidd’s 
phenomenological toolkit—the aim of which is to give the patient’s 
word with respect to their illness more epistemic value, to the doctor 
and to themselves—extend itself out to the direct experience of the 
doctor. This runs the risk, however, of reestablishing, by default, 
the epistemic privilege experienced by the doctor (i.e., before the 
application of the toolkit). Taking into consideration that the ultimate 
goal of the toolkit is to lend a voice to the voiceless—in the form of 
phenomenological expression—if the doctor, who already possessed 
a rather deafening voice to begin with, is elevated in concert with the 
patient, then the old dynamic (i.e., of a doctor who systematically holds 
more epistemic authority than the patient) has simply been reinstated. 
8 Training, recruiting, and paying full-time mediators is the most 
considerable of these administrative concerns. 
authority, but also a lack of empathy. Both doctor and patient represent 
complex, subjective states of being, such that a truly useful forum for 
open communication ought to involve more than just an opportunity 
for the patient to speak and be heard. This means that the boundary of 
the phenomenological toolkit needs to be broadened. 
As it stands, the first two of its three steps—bracketing the natural 
attitude toward illness and thematizing illness—do encourage some 
involvement from clinicians. Carel and Kidd suggest, in the former, 
that both doctor and patient, instead of believing in the disease entity 
itself, ought to learn to see the disease as it expresses itself through the 
patient’s direct experience (e.g., through symptoms, fear of death, et 
cetera). Similarly, in explaining the second step, the authors recognize 
that, “[patients, family members, and health professionals] each will 
thematize an illness differently.”5 It is the third step, however— 
“reviewing the ill person’s being in the world”—that isolates the ill 
person’s experience from that of the doctor.6 What is more, each step 
can be improved by encouraging the patient to access the clinician’s 
own subjective experience. 
Because one’s preconceptions are inextricably linked with 
one’s sense of identity (or one’s subjectivity), the only way for these 
preconceptions to be constructively challenged is for them to clash with 
another identity, forcing the objectification of one’s own subjectivity, 
which naturally facilitates empathy (i.e., the acknowledgement of an 
equally valid subjectivity in someone else). This cannot be a passive 
experience. Carel and Kidd’s undeveloped toolkit, even without the 
steps required to accomplish this, already has this goal in mind: “The 
toolkit is a patient resource, but it is also aimed at training clinicians. If 
clinicians are trained in this way and, consequently, become more open 
to patients’ experiences and better able to interpret them, this would be 
yet another way to address the hermeneutical gap.”7 
I suggest three amendments be made to better realize Carel 
and Kidd’s goals: (1) bidirectional expression of intent, (2) formal 
mediation, and (3) posthumous review. (1) The doctor, in addition to 
the patient, will be invited to participate in each of the three steps of 
the phenomenological toolkit, not passively but actively. This means 
that both patient and doctor will be given the opportunity to reevaluate 
what it means to be ill, specifically in relation to the self. The doctor 
and patient will each reassess the disease entity, its thematization, 
5 Carel and Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare,” 538. 
6 Carel and Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare,” 538. 
7 By “hermeneutical gap,” Carel and Kidd are referring to the 
communication gap caused by hermeneutical injustice; See Carel and 
Kidd, “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare,” 537.
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but rather professionally trained in mediation), the “old dynamic” 
mentioned above will be avoided.
In forming my thesis, I anticipated the possibility that these ideas 
may be overly ambitious and difficult to implement without adequate 
preparation. While this remains true, this does not, however, prove 
that they will not be effective or that they should not be attempted. 
The medical industry is incredibly lucrative, and while its resources 
are limited, my modified toolkit contains, if desired, a new field of 
expertise: doctor/patient mediation. This could have far-reaching 
implications not only on modern medicine, but also on many aspects 
of society—education, economics, and psychology—the least of which 
may be wealth creation. As a final note, the gradual application of these 
principles, if necessary, could better facilitate their total implementation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, epistemic injustice derives from a systemic 
prejudice against ill persons within the medical profession. Its source, 
epistemic privilege, is a result of (1) HCPs overestimating the value 
of their own knowledge, (2) HCPs underestimating the value of their 
patients’ knowledge, (3) patients overestimating the value of their 
doctors’ knowledge, and (4) patients underestimating the value of 
their own knowledge. Because an undue lack of trust has caused and 
continues to perpetuate this issue, restoring this trust ought to be our 
main objective. 
In this paper, I have analyzed and supplemented Carel and Kidd’s 
alleged solution to epistemic injustice, the phenomenological toolkit, 
with some additional steps of my own. The purpose of these steps is to 
extract the doctor’s own perspective on existential issues, so as to elicit 
a clash of consciousness. This clash—perhaps best summarized as a 
moment of epiphany during which a subjective being becomes aware of 
their own objectivity in addition to the subjectivity of someone else—is 
meant to facilitate empathy. Once this empathy has been allowed to 
thrive, an environment rife with open communication will restore 
the trust that epistemic injustice, by way of epistemic privilege, had 
destroyed.
Because these notions are theoretical only, and because they could, 
if implemented, restructure an industry that usually resists change, I 
recommend that researchers in the field undergo extensive experiments 
to validate my hypotheses. These experiments should include one-
on-one discussions between doctors and patients, both addressing 
their individual roles in the process, with the assistance of a third-
party mediator, likely being filled by a volunteer during the beginning 
Injustice stems from an imbalance or an inequality. While it is certainly 
a point of contention to admit it, the only viable method of reinstating 
equality (i.e., correcting the imbalance) is by an act, however 
temporary, of inequality.
What is more, the application of my modified toolkit, which 
includes three steps—bidirectional expression of intent, formal 
mediation, and posthumous review—is almost impossible to implement 
unless at great financial cost to the healthcare industry. Because of 
its specific and formal structure—a quality that Carel and Kidd’s 
unmodified toolkit lacks—the toolkit I propose requires immense 
administrative overhauls, redistribution of funds, and even the 
generation of a new career field. Unless it can be demonstrated that 
these changes are effective (e.g., in some sort of clinical trial) not to 
mention how they will be funded, the risks associated with making 
these changes outweigh the benefits.
V. RESPONSE TO OBJECTION
While these critiques are reasonable, they are founded upon 
incorrect assumptions and the misrepresentation of my overall argument. 
Left unchecked, Carel and Kidd’s phenomenological toolkit fails to 
adequately address the doctor’s perspective. My objective—different from 
theirs—is to correct not epistemic injustice, but epistemic privilege. To 
address the first critique, unless the doctor more actively participates in 
the patient’s experience (regarding their own illness), like a conversation 
or a friendship, then this is impossible. The worst possible result—
though admittedly better than what we have right now—is the patient 
walking away having been forever changed, while the doctor remains the 
same. This is especially disconcerting when considering that the doctor 
must treat patient after patient. Claiming, as stated above, that the “only 
viable method of reinstating equality … is by an act … of inequality” 
presupposes two mistruths: that (1) systemic injustice rests on a two-
dimensional plane, and that (2) justice must be retaliatory. 
While it can probably be said that privilege itself must be 
taken away from one group before it can be given to another, the 
redistribution of privilege is not our objective. We do not desire patient 
privilege; we desire doctor/patient epistemic equality. The doctor’s 
perspective need not be lowered beneath that of the patient; the 
patient’s perspective, instead, must rise to meet the doctor’s. Despite 
my confidence in this motion, the second step of my modified toolkit 
is specifically designed to address this issue, to ensure that epistemic 
justice prevails in each and every doctor/patient interaction. By the 
introduction of an impartial third-party (ideally not medically trained 
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stages of the experiments. Researchers should then conduct individual 
interviews with each of the three participants, observing, if possible, 
a correlation between the clinician’s openness and the patient’s level 
of trust. These qualities should be tracked with an assigned number 
value—e.g., 1 for “not significant” and 5 for “very significant.”
As I have stated previously, the doctors of today—perhaps, tragically, 
without knowing it—have a vested interest in the successful eradication 
of epistemic privilege. The true healers—those who have taken the 
Hippocratic Oath in earnest, those who serve the public out of compassion 
and not economic or social prestige—must admit that a lack of trust 
between themselves and their patients, especially from their patients, 
inhibits the doctor in their quest to heal the sick. It must be admitted, 
then, that this system, in its current form—that which treats its patients 
like objects, that which concedes to the disease entity more humanity 
than the person afflicted—is inimical to the core philosophy of modern 
medicine. As we have seen throughout history, social change is not easily 
obtained. What is more, it is often difficult to imagine how necessary 
social change is until we have already grown accustomed to the ways in 
which it has improved society. We are, then, indebted—now not unlike 
then—to those among us who are able to see the wind before the storm. 
Might there, then, be no better assessment of a society’s compassion 
than the way it treats the weakest of its citizens? 
